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Non-technical summary
The solution of many environmental problems requires international cooperation. Due
to the voluntary nature of cooperation, agreements must be beneficiary to all parties
and be perceived to be equitable. Obligations in international agreements are typically
differentiated between developing and developed countries. In particular in the climate
debate, exemptions for developing countries are motivated by egalitarian arguments on
per-capita emission levels. Besides this, possessory equity arguments to base targets
on present or recent emission levels seem to play a vital role in several international
agreements.
This paper studies the impact of equity considerations on the stability of international
agreements between heterogeneous countries. We show that allowing countries to fi-
nance abatement projects in developing countries which, due to equity-reasons, have no
binding emission targets can reduce the number of cooperating countries and thereby
be welfare-decreasing. Equity-concerns in industrialized countries regarding the gap
between per-capita emission levels of industrialized and developing countries lead to
an increased reduction in industrialized countries but do not qualitatively change the
incentives to cooperate. Only if countries are inequality-averse with respect to po-
tential differences between their abatement targets and those of other industrialized
countries is the inclusion of developing countries generally profitable both in terms of
participation rates and of emission reduction.
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1 Introduction
The solution of many environmental problems, such as global warming and the deple-
tion of the ozone layer, requires international cooperation. Due to the voluntary nature
of cooperation, agreements must be beneficiary to all parties and be perceived to be
equitable. Obligations in international agreements are typically differentiated between
developing and developed countries. In particular in the climate debate, exemptions
for developing countries are motivated by egalitarian arguments on per-capita emis-
sion levels (Raymond 2003). Besides this, possessory equity arguments to base targets
on present or recent emission levels seem to play a vital role in several international
agreements.1
This paper studies the impact of three different notions of equity on the chances of
voluntary cooperation between countries: (i) Exempting developing countries from
binding emission targets while opening them for other countries to finance abatement
projects, (ii) equity-concerns with respect to differences in per-capita emissions be-
tween developing and developed countries, and (iii) inequality-aversion regarding the
abatement targets of industrialized countries. We find that only the latter qualitatively
increases the chances of cooperation.
The standard approach to the study of coalition formation was formulated by Barrett
(1992, 1994) and Carraro and Siniscalco (1993). They use a two-period structure and
study cooperation within a non-cooperative framework: Countries must first decide
whether or not to join a coalition. Countries inside the coalition then behave coop-
eratively with respect to each other. However, both the coalition and the remaining
countries choose their emission levels non-cooperatively. A coalition is stable if there
is neither an incentive to join nor to leave the coalition. Barrett (1992, 1994, 1997),
Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), and Hoel (1992) have shown that – although there is co-
1Raymond (2003) characterizes grandfathering as a possessory rule. Equal measures for the signing
countries are used in the LRTAP protocol on reduction of sulphur emissions (minus 30% based on
1980 level) or in the LRTAP protocol concerning the control of volatile organic compounds (minus
30% based on 1999 level).
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operation – the coalition size is rather small. Even if one allows for transfers to allocate
the efficiency gains from cooperation according to a special rule (Nash-Bargaining or
Shapley-value), as shown by Barrett (1997, 2001) and Botteon and Carraro (1997), only
a few (three) countries cooperate.2 This pessimistic result on international cooperation
is confirmed by empirical studies. Murdoch and Sandler (1997) on the Montreal proto-
col and Bo¨hringer and Vogt (2004) on the Kyoto-protocol, find that those agreements
do not substantially differ from symbolic policy.
All these theoretical studies base on a pure cost-benefit analysis and do not take any
equity-considerations into account. Looking at the climate change debate, there are
different dimensions in which equity considerations seem to play a vital role. Promi-
nently, equity arguments are frequently used with respect to an equalization of per
capita emission levels.3 They are stressed not only by delegates of developing coun-
tries, but also by environmental interest groups in developed countries. A government
facing voters with such preferences must clearly take them into account. The weight
that a government attaches to the equity argument will then depend on the impact
these interest groups have on the national policy. As observed by Cazorla and Toman
(2001, p. 238), “Equity might be one motivation for countries to pursue GHG emis-
sions policies. However, equity principles will not override other elements of national
self-interest.”
In climate policy, equity issues play different roles: Reflecting the huge differences
in living standards and per-capita emissions, developing countries are exempted from
binding emission targets under the Kyoto-protocol. Other countries can however pur-
sue abatement in developing countries by financing abatement projects under the Clean
2There is, however, the possibility of enlarging a coalition using an appropriate transfer scheme if
countries are sufficiently asymmetric. Botteon and Carraro (1997) show that even the grand coalition
can be stable if transfer payments are calculated using a two-stage Shapley-value procedure. Note
that transfers are equivalent to an appropriate distribution of tradable emission permits.
3This principle of equity is even fixed in Article 3 of the Convention on Climate Change as well
as in the decision approved by the COP 6 in Bonn which states that measures shall be implemented
“...with a view to reducing emissions in a manner conducive to narrowing per capita differences
between developed and developing country Parties”.
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Development Mechanism. In addition, (some) industrialized countries may feel a cer-
tain responsibility for climate change since they have contributed the by far biggest
share of greenhouse gas emissions. Evidence for this can be found in statements by
environmental groups, which should have some impact as voters on the formulation
of national policy. Therefore, this dimension of equity-concerns can be reflected by
some “warm glow” effect from internalizing more than the own environmental dam-
ages or equivalently by inequality-aversion with respect to the differences in per-capita
emissions between developing an developed countries. Another dimension of equity is
concerned with a fair distribution of burdens which often comes down to similar reduc-
tion targets. Several proposal during the negotiations such as by the U.S. and Germany
base the allocation of emission targets on present or recent emission levels (Raymond
2003,p.168-169). Similar abatement targets have the virtue of being easier to accept.
On the one hand, they can provide a focal point in negotiations (Schelling 1960), on
the other hand they might reduce political pressure: If a country has a much higher
abatement target than most others, some political interest groups can use this compar-
ison to lobby for less strict targets. If a country, however, has much smaller abatement
targets than others, environmental interest groups probably more efficiently lobby in
favor of a stricter environmental policy. Consequently, countries may exhibit inequality
aversion with respect to differences in abatement targets of industrialized countries.
While the impact of equity considerations on financial burdens has been studied in
several models (eg. Tol (2000), Bo¨hringer and Helm (2001)), the importance of fair-
ness and equity considerations – or equity-preferences – so far has played little role in
the theoretical analysis of coalition formation. Exceptions are Jeppesen and Ander-
sen (1998) and Hoel and Schneider (1997), who introduce a non-material payoff from
membership or a disutility from breaking the agreement, respectively, and Bosello et
al. (2001) who study the stability of coalitions for different equity rules that deter-
mine the burden-sharing between cooperating countries. Lange and Vogt (2002) have
a different approach on fairness: They rely on a preference structure given by ERC-
theory (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) in which which the utility of a country is not solely
based on the absolute payoff but also on the relative payoff compared to the overall
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payoff to all agents. Lange and Vogt (200) show that for countries which are suffi-
ciently inequality-averse with respect to comparing their payoff to those of others, even
the grand coalition can be stable. The analysis, however, is restricted to symmetric
countries.
This paper extends the analysis of equity-preferences to the heterogeneous country
case. According to the U.N. differentiation into developed and developing nations,
we assume throughout the paper that only developed countries take on obligations to
reduce emissions. Developing countries are exempted from immediate reductions but
can provide cheap abatement opportunities via mechanisms like CDM. Although being
an exogenous assumption, it reflects concerns of these countries that (i) because of
their small per capita emission levels, they are not responsible for the problem, and
(ii) a restriction in their emissions would hinder growth and fix their per capita income
at a small level. It is widely recognized that developing countries must face emission
targets in the long run. For the one-period model considered in this paper, however, the
exogenous assumption is reasonable. Throughout the paper we assume that emissions
trading among cooperating countries is used to minimize abatement costs.
We first study the effect of allowing abatement in developing countries on the incentives
of developed nations to cooperate. We find that the inclusion of such abatement
possibilities, e.g. via CDM, can reduce the number of cooperating countries and thereby
be welfare-decreasing. We then analyze the impact of equity-preferences on the stability
of international agreements: Developed countries may be inequality-averse with respect
to (i) the difference in per capita emissions between industrialized and developing
countries, and (ii) differences in their abatement target to the average of abatement
by all other industrialized countries.4 In line with Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), a
country’s utility is therefore determined by its absolute payoff and the (dis)utility from
the respective inequalities.
4In addition to comparing their abatement to the average, countries clearly might also care about
inequalities between other countries. However, with its own abatement target each country can
influence its own relative position but not potential inequalities among other countries. We therefore
include the comparison to the average of other countries only.
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For inequality concerns regarding the gap between per-capita emission levels of in-
dustrialized and developing countries, our model predicts that such concerns lead to
an increased reduction in industrialized countries but do not qualitatively change the
incentives to cooperate. This is different if countries compare their abatement targets
with that of other industrialized countries and are inequality-averse with respect to po-
tential differences in abatement targets. By relying on numerical simulations, we show
that results substantially change if (some) countries are concerned with this equity-
criterion. On one hand, the inclusion of developing countries is generally profitable
both in terms of participation rates and of emission reduction if countries are at least
slightly inequality-averse. On another hand, we find that equity-preferences lead to a
higher degree of cooperation – even the grand coalition can be stabilized if countries
are sufficiently inequality-averse. With this, we confirm results by Lange and Vogt
(2003) for asymmetric countries.
The paper is organized in the following way: After introducing the model (section 2),
we discuss the role of allowing countries to undertake abatement projects in developing
countries in section 3. Here we rely on standard preferences. We then discuss the
role of equity-preferences in section 4. We first discuss inequality-concerns regarding
the difference in per-capita emissions between developing and industrialized countries
(section 4.1) and then turn to studying inequality-aversion with respect to abatement
targets (section 4.2). The final section – as always – concludes.
2 The basic model
We consider n developed countries, indexed by i = 1, . . . , n, and the aggregate of
developing countries, i = 0. Each country i = 0, . . . , n is characterized by its abatement
cost function ci(ei) (decreasing, convex) which depends on the emission level ei. We
assume linear marginal abatement costs −c′i(ei) = αi − βiei, i.e.:
ci(ei) =
1
2βi
(αi − βiei)2 (1)
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Environmental damages di(E) in the respective countries depend on the sum of all
countries’ emissions E =
∑
i ei. Environmental damages are assumed to be linear:
di(E) = γiE (2)
The payoff to a country is therefore determined by
yi = −ci(ei)− di(
∑
j
ej) + ti (3)
where ti denotes transfer payments to country i.
If a country cooperates with some other countries, we assume that an emissions trad-
ing system is established. Given an emissions target,e¯i, a country can achieve this
emissions target by reducing by itself, buying permits on the emissions trading market
at an endogenous emissions price p, or by investing in abatement projects in develop-
ing countries. The payment balance according to these activities is captured by the
transfers ti.
The analysis in this paper relies on a preference structure in which (some) developed
countries – along with their own absolute payoff – are possibly motivated by equity-
concerns. The approach is similar to the ERC-model by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)
and the approach taken by Lange and Vogt (2002) in which equity is based on the
relative payoff of an agent. In order to capture the equity arguments most prominently
used in the climate debate, we introduce equity-preferences of industrialized countries
with respect to (i) differences in per-capita emissions between developing and industri-
alized countries (egalitarian arguments), and (ii) differences in emission reduction from
the status quo between industrialized countries (possessory arguments). We assume
that in the status quo, no climate policy is pursued, i.e. status quo emissions e0i in
country i are determined by −c′i(e0i ) = 0.
Let the total population size of industrialized countries (i = 1, . . . , n) be denoted by
LIND. Similarly, E¯IND is the emissions target in industrialized countries which may differ
from the actual emissions if abatement projects in developing countries are financed.
Analogously for developing countries, the population is denoted by LDEV, the emission
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level by E¯DEV = e¯0. Then, the difference between (assigned) per capita emission levels
between industrialized countries and developing countries is measured by
σ = E¯IND − E¯DEV
LDEV
LIND
and the relative reduction requirement in country i compared to all industrialized
countries is given by
δi = [
e0i − e¯i
e0i
− E
0
IND − E¯IND
E0IND
]e0i
We assume that if an industrialized country (some people inside these countries) has
equity-preferences with respect to per-capita emissions, they suffer some disutility from
σ > 0 which increases in σ. Similarly, inequality-aversion with respect to reduction
compared to other industrialized countries induces disutility from δ 6= 0.
To put this more formally, the utility of a developed country i = 1, . . . , n is given by:
Ui = yi + aiq(δi) + bir(σ)
where ai, bi ≥ 0, denotes the weight of the respective equity preference. r(·) is differ-
entiable, concave and decreasing for σ > 0. q(·) is also differentiable, concave and has
its maximum at δi = 0 (q
′(0) = 0).
In some parts of the paper we assume for illustrational purposes5
q(δi) = −(δi)2/2 r(σ) = −σ
In the following, we study a two-stage game of international negotiations as introduced
by Barrett (1994), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), and Hoel (1992). In the first stage,
countries decide whether or not to join a coalition S. Here, each country takes the de-
cisions of the other countries as given. Each country i also anticipates, however, that
the emission levels, which are chosen in the second stage, and national welfare Ui(S)
depend on the coalition S, i.e. on whether it does or does not enter the coalition. In
5The linear specification of r(·) reflects the fact that because of climate policy, the differences in
per-capita emissions are not change too much. Hence, the derivative r′(·) is more or less constant.
The reduction targets, however, can differ substantially across industrialized countries such that, here,
a non-linear function seems to be reasonable.
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stage 2, countries inside and outside the coalition simultaneously select their abatement
levels. The coalition plays Nash against the non-signatory-countries, which simulta-
neously maximize their individual utility. A coalition is stable if Ui(S) ≥ Ui(S\i) for
i ∈ S and Ui(S) ≥ Ui(S + i) for i /∈ S.
3 Exemptions for developing countries
In this section we study the consequences of allowing cooperating countries to (par-
tially) achieve their emission reduction by financing projects in developing countries,
e.g. via project-based mechanisms like CDM. Developing countries do not get ab-
solute emissions targets. This may be due to equity-considerations, e.g. a lack in
responsibility for the historical emissions or the need for economic growth; or, simply,
because the willingness-to-pay for climate policy is limited due to more urgent develop-
ing problems. In our model which essentially captures only one period, these different
arguments can be equivalently captured by γ0 = 0. Developing countries can, however,
provide abatement possibilities to developed countries via project-based mechanisms
like CDM.
In order to decompose the effect of exemptions for developing countries from potential
equity-preferences of developed countries, we assume in this section that ai = bi = 0
for all i = 1, . . . , n, i.e. no industrialized country is equity-oriented.
First note that for our specification of utility functions (1), (2), non-cooperating devel-
oped countries choose
−c′i(ei) = d′i(E) eNi =
αi − γi
βi
(4)
If a coalition S is formed, its members take into account the damages they cause in all
cooperating countries. The coalition maximizes the total payoff to its members.6 We
6As we assume that emission allowances can be traded, it is always optimal to maximize total
payoff. Individual payoffs can be reshuffled by an appropriate assignment of emission targets e¯i.
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therefore obtain as the optimal emission levels in a coalition S:
−c′i(ei) =
∑
i∈S
d′i(E) e
S
i =
αi −
∑
j∈S γj
βi
(5)
The aggregate emission level E(S) is then determined by
E(S) =
∑
i6∈S
eNi +
∑
i∈S
eSi
=
∑
i
αi
βi
−
∑
i6∈S
γi
βi
−
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈S γj
βi
The payoff to an individual country in the coalition can be adjusted by assigning a
certain number e¯Si of permits which are traded at a price equalling marginal abatement
costs, σS =
∑
j∈S γj. Given a coalition S, we denote the payoff to a country i ∈ S is
therefore given by
Ui(S) = −ci(eSi )− di(E(S)) + σS(e¯Si − eSi )
whereas for i 6∈ S:
Ui(S) = −ci(eNi )− di(E(S))
Country i has an incentive to enter the coalition S only if Ui(S ∪ i) ≥ Ui(S\i). A
coalition S can therefore only be sustained by appropriate allocation of emission rights
(or respective transfers) if
∆(S) :=
∑
i∈S
Ui(S)−
∑
i∈S
Ui(S\i) ≥ 0
We show in the appendix that
∆(S) = −3
2
∑
i∈S
γ2i
βi
− 1
2
∑
i∈S
1
βi
(
∑
i∈S
γi)
2 +
∑
i∈S
γi(
∑
i∈S
γi
βi
) +
∑
i∈S
γ2i (
∑
i∈S
1
βi
) (6)
We are interested in the effect of the existence of country 0 which does not reduce
emissions by itself but allows for other countries to finance abatement activities on the
incentives to form a coalition. We therefore compare ∆(S ∪ 0) and ∆(S\0). Denoting
the number of cooperating industrialized countries by k(S), their average marginal
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damages by EXP(γi, S) = (
∑
i∈S\0 γi)/k(S), and its variance by VAR(γi, S), simple
algebra yields:
∆(S ∪ 0)−∆(S\0) = − 1
2β0
(
∑
j∈S
γj)
2 +
∑
i∈S
γ2i
β0
=
k(S)
2β0
[2VAR(γi, S)− (k(S)− 2)EXP(γi, S)2]
We obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The incentives to form a particular coalition S of size k(S) can only
be increased by allowing for abatement in developing countries if
VAR(γi, S) >
k(S)− 2
2
EXP(γi, S)
2
Therefore, only if the cooperating countries differ sufficiently with respect to their
vulnerability from climate change, could the inclusion of developing countries via CDM
be used to attract more countries. Otherwise, the possibility of abating in developing
countries reduces the incentives to cooperate among developed nations. If countries
are similar or, in the extreme, have the same marginal damages (VAR(γi, S) = 0),
allowing for abatement in a country 0 can never increase the resulting coalition size.
If, however, VAR(γi, S) >
k(S)−2
2
EXP(γi, S)
2, then the coalition S could be sustained
if only β0 is small enough, i.e. developing countries can provide very inexpensive
abatement opportunities.
Further, consider the case in which βi = β for all i. Here, we obtain from (6):
∆(S\0) = k(S)
2β
[(2k(S)− 3)VAR(γi, S)− (k(S)− 3)(k(S)− 1)EXP(γi, S)2]
∆(S ∪ 0) = k(S)
2β
[(2k(S)− 1)VAR(γi, S)− (k(S)2 − 3k(S) + 1)EXP(γi, S)2]
Hence, without allowing for abatement in country 0, a coalition S\0 can be sustained
if:
VAR(γi, S) ≥ (k(S)− 3)(k(S)− 1)
2k(S)− 3 EXP(γi, S)
2
whereas S ∪ 0 can be sustained if
VAR(γi, S) ≥ k(S)
2 − 3k(S) + 1
2k(S)− 1 EXP(γi, S)
2
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It can easily be shown that (k(S)−3)(k(S)−1)
2k(S)−3 <
k(S)2−3k(S)+1
2k(S)−1 for k(S) ≥ 2. That is, if
no country has an incentive to leave the coalition S ∪ 0, also the coalition S\0 can be
sustained. We therefore obtain the following result:
Proposition 2 If the slope of marginal abatement costs is identical across countries,
allowing for abatement in developing countries (country 0) can never increase the coali-
tion size of developed countries (k(S)).
Note that if countries have the same marginal damages (VAR(γi, S) = 0), the maximal
coalition size is 3 without allowing for abatement in country 0 – as well-known from
the literature. Here, using abatement possibilities in developing countries, reduces the
number of cooperating countries to 2!
Using the results on the number of cooperating countries, we now turn to the envi-
ronmental effectiveness of the resulting coalitions. It is clear that if the entrance of
the developing country does not induce other countries to leave, the total emissions
decrease due to the abatement of country 0 by
∑
i∈S γi/β0. If, however, the incentives
are reduced such that a country i ≥ 1 leaves the coalition, this country i increases its
emissions by
∑
j∈S\i γj/βi, whereas all remaining countries inside the coalition increase
their emissions by a total of
∑
j∈S\i γi/βj. The total effect on emissions from country
0 entering and country i leaving is therefore∑
j∈S,j 6=i,0
[γj/βi + γi/βj − γj/β0]
which is positive unless the entering country 0 had a sufficiently small β0. That is,
country 0 would be needed to have a very elastic abatement supply function which
leads to a large reduction of emissions to compensate for the increase since the marginal
damages caused in country i are no longer taken into account.
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4 Equity-preferences in (some) developed countries
4.1 Equity with respect to per-capita emissions
Let us now consider the case where some industrialized countries experience disutility
from the huge differences in per-capita emissions between industrialized and developing
countries, i.e. bi > 0. We still assume ai = 0 for all i.
Here, for our specification of utility functions, non-cooperating developed countries
choose
−c′i(ei) = d′i(E)− bir′(σ) eNi =
αi − (γi + bi)
βi
Similarly, the maximization of total payoff by a coalition S under the (exogenous)
assumption that the emissions target of the developing country stays at tis status quo
level, leads to
−c′i(ei) =
∑
i∈S
d′i(E)− bir′(σ) eSi =
αi −
∑
j∈S(γj + bj)
βi
Comparing these first order conditions with (4) and (5), it is obvious that such an
equity orientation has a similar impact to local environmental damages: It increases
the willingness-to-pay for emissions reduction. Countries behave identically to having
increased marginal damages, γi + bi, but no equity-preference. Abatement levels in
industrialized countries therefore increase. Qualitatively, however, all the results from
the previous section apply:
Corollary 1 If (some) industrialized countries exhibit equity-preferences based on a
comparison of per-capita emissions in industrialized and developing countries, the in-
centives to cooperate do not change qualitatively. In particular, allowing for abate-
ment in developing countries (country 0) can never increase the coalition size of de-
veloped countries (k(S)) if the slope of marginal abatement costs is identical across
countries. In all coalitions, however, the emission reduction is increased due to the
equity-preference.
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4.2 Inequality-aversion with respect abatement targets
We now turn to the case of equity-orientation in terms of inequality-aversion with
respect to abatement targets in industrialized countries, i.e. ai > 0. For ease of
presentation, we assume here, that bi = 0 for all i.
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Let us first consider a non-cooperating country. This maximizes
max
∑
∈S
−ci(ei)− di(E) + aiq(−ei + E¯IND
E0IND
e0i )
which yields
−c′i(ei) = d′i(E) + aiq′(δi)(1−
e0i
E0IND
)
αi − βiei = γi + ai(ei − E¯IND
E0IND
e0i )(1−
e0i
E0IND
) (7)
A coalition S maximizes its joint payoff. We again assume that the (assigned) emission
level of the developing countries is exogenously given at its status quo. Developing
countries only provide abatement possibilities to developed countries via project-based
mechanisms like CDM. The coalition therefore has to solve the following problem where
we define for notational simplicity a0 = 0:
max
∑
∈S
−ci(ei)− di(E) + aiq(−e¯i + E¯IND
E0IND
e0i )
s.t.
∑
i∈S
ei =
∑
i∈S
e¯i
Let us define E¯S =
∑
i∈S\0 e¯i as the emission target of industrialized countries inside
the coalition. This can partially be acchieved by abating in the developing country 0
if this is included in the coalition. In this case, we would have
∑
i∈S e¯i = E¯S + e
0
0.
Solving the above maximization problem and denoting the Lagrange multiplier by λ,
we obtain
−c′i(ei) = λ+
∑
j∈S
d′i(E)
aiq
′(δi) = λ+
∑
j∈S
ajq
′(δj)
e0j
E0IND
for all i ∈ S\0
7As in the previous section, bi > 0 would not change the results!
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Consequently, for all industrialized countries inside the coalition we have identical
aiq
′(δi). This implies that either all countries inside the coalition abate more or all
abate less than the rest of industrialized countries.
We can rewrite the first-order conditions as
aiq
′(δi) = ajq′(δj)
= aj(e¯j − E¯IND
E0IND
e0j)
= (
∑
j∈S\0
1/aj)
−1(ES − E¯IND
E0IND
E0S)
λ = aiq
′(δi)(1−
∑
j∈S\0 e
0
j
E0IND
) = aiq
′(δi)(1− E
0
S
E0IND
)
= (
∑
j∈S\0
1/aj)
−1(E¯S − E¯IND
E0IND
E0S)(1−
E0S
E0IND
)
and arrive at
−c′i(ei) = λ+
∑
j∈S
d′i(E)
αi − βiei =
∑
j∈S
γj + (
∑
j∈S\0
1/aj)
−1(E¯S − E¯IND
E0IND
E0S)(1−
E0S
E0IND
) (8)
for all i ∈ S.
Note that if at least one country puts no weight on equity-issues (ai = 0 for some
i ∈ S), the emission choice of the coalition does not depend on the equity-weights of
other members of the coalition. Only the internal redistribution of abatement burdens
will be affected. If all members of the coalition put some weight on equity, i.e. ai > 0
for all i ∈ S, a further increase of some ai leads to an extension of emissions if the
abatement in the coalition is already larger than that of outsiders. Analogously, the
emissions of outsiders change with their equity-parameter.
In general, conditions (7) and (8) provide an implicit definition of emission levels re-
sulting in equilibrium. The formula for the aggregate emission level is given in the
Appendix. The impact of higher equity-orientation on aggregate emissions, however,
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is ambiguous. To see this, consider a situation in which exactly one country i puts
no weight on equity whereas the equity-parameter aj of all other countries j 6= i gets
to infinity. Then, the resulting equilibrium depends on whether or not country i is
a member of the coalition. If not (i 6∈ S), it’s emission level stays at (αi − γi)/βi,
i.e. the abatement (in percent) is given by γi/αi. This fraction then determines the
(average) abatement of all other countries. The impact of equity-orientation on total
emissions therefore depends on how damages in country i compare to those in the
rest of the world. Differently, if country i is inside the coalition, the abatement of S
is not affected by the increasing equity-orientation. Outsiders, however, adjust their
abatement towards the level chosen by the coalition.
We can use these specification of the equilibrium to investigate the stability of coali-
tions. Here, even for our linear-quadratic specification of the utility functions, a general
solution of the problem seems untractable. By relying on numerical examples instead,
we can however show that most of the results from the previous section change if (some)
countries are inequality-averse with respect to abatement targets. We study the spe-
cific case of two different types 1, 2 of developed countries, the number of each type
being 5, which differ only with respect to their (marginal) damages and with respect
to their equity orientation. We assume
n1 = n2 = 5 α = 100 β = 1
In our numerical simulation we vary the damages γi ∈ {0.5, 5} and the respective
equity-weight, ai ∈ {0, 1, 2, 5}. In order to explore the impact of potentially cheap
abatement in developing countries, we look at two specifications of their abatement
costs, β0 ∈ {0.1, 1}.
Analogously to the previous section, we study the stability of a coalition by looking
at the difference in utility levels ∆(S). We again distinguish two scenarios: DEV if
abatement in developing countries is possible, i.e. 0 ∈ S, and IND if all abatement has
to be undertaken in developed countries, i.e. 0 6∈ S.
Table 1 states the maximal coalitions with their respective aggregate emission level
and aggregate payoff for which ∆(S) ≥ 0. Here, a stable coalition S is maximal if there
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a1 a2 Coalition
total
emissions total payoff
IND 0 0 k1+k2=3 920.00 -46425
1 1 k1+k2=2 967.84 -48510
2 2 k1+k2=2 978.02 -48969
5 5 GRAND 500.00 -37500
0 5 k1=1,k2=4 854.09 -44400
k1=2,k2=1 936.36 -47268
DEV (0=1) 0 0 k1+k2=2 930.00 -46750
1 1 k1+k2=5 814.29 -42418
2 2 k1+k2=6 744.57 -40273
5 5 k1+k2=8 585.23 -37091
0 5 k1=1,k2=3 854.35 -43932
k1=3, k2=1 831.08 -43013
DEV (0=0.2) 0 0 k1+k2=2 890.00 -44950
1 1 k1+k2=5 730.77 -38979
2 2 GRAND 250.00 -31250
5 5 GRAND 250.00 -31250
0 5 k1=1, k2=3 758.70 -40211
k1=2, k2=1 793.92 -41265
Tabelle: For gamma1=5. gamma2=5
Table 1: Maximal stable coalitions with total emissions E¯IND and aggregate payoff levels for
industrial countries. Results are given for γ1 = γ2 = 5, α = 100, β1 = β2 = 1, for different
levels of inequality-aversion and for β0 ∈ {0.1, 1}.
is no Sˆ ⊃ S for which ∆(Sˆ) ≥ 0. That is, a maximal coalition cannot be enlarged.
Let us first discuss the results for the symmetric case, γ1 = γ2 = 5. Here, if no
abatement in developing countries is possible (scenario IND) and countries are not
inequality-averse (a1 = a2 = 0), maximally 3 countries cooperate as is well-known
from the literature. For intermediate levels of inequality-aversion (a1 = a2 = 1, 2), only
coalitions of two countries are stable. Here, inequality-aversion obviously leads to a
more pessimistic prediction on cooperation, both in terms of the number of cooperating
countries as well as in terms of total emissions and total payoff. If, however, countries
are sufficiently interested in equity (a1 = a2 = 5), the grand coalition can be sustained.
This basically confirms the result by Lange and Vogt (2003) for the symmetric country
case. If only type 2 countries are interested in equity (a1 = 0, a2 = 5) a higher level of
cooperation can be sustained.
In line with the previous section, the inclusion of developing countries (country 0) into
the coalition cannot improve the cooperation for standard preferences (a1 = a2 = 0).
Rather, it destroys the stability of the 3-country coalition. It thereby leads to welfare-
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a1 a2 Coalition
total
emissions total payoff
IND 0 0 k1=2, k2=2 939.50 -26116
k1=5, k2=1 935.00 -25931
1 1 k1=1, k2=2 972.52 -26853
k1=5, k2=1 957.33 -26500
2 2 GRAND 725.00 -23719
5 5 GRAND 725.00 -23719
0 5 k1=1, k2=3 934.18 -26211
k1=3, k2=2 938.77 -26200
k1=5, k2=1 951.36 -26379
5 0 k1=5, k2=2 897.50 -25266
DEV (0=1) 0 0 k1=1, k2=2 941.00 -26136
k1=5, k2=1 927.50 -25753
1 1 k1=1, k2=4 860.06 -24675
k1=4, k2=3 842.75 -24353
k1=5, k2=2 878.73 -24848
2 2 k1=2, k2=5 762.78 -23612
k1=5, k2=4 759.25 -23526
5 5 GRAND 697.50 -23341
0 5 k1=1, k2=3 902.77 -25506
k1=5, k2=2 863.86 -24599
5 0 k1=2, k2=4 798.19 -23920
k1=4, k2=3 840.89 -24391
k1=5, k2=2 885.00 -25000
DEV (0=0.2) 0 0 k1=4, k2=1 909.50 -25306
1 1 k1=1, k2=5 707.41 -22386
k1=5, k2=4 668.99 -22057
2 2 GRAND 587.50 -21828
5 5 GRAND 587.50 -21828
0 5 k1=5, k2=2 797.59 -23329
5 0 GRAND 587.50 -21828
Tabelle: For gamma1=5. gamma2=5
Table 2: Maximal stable coalitions with total emissions E¯IND and aggregate payoff levels for
industrial countries. Results are given for γ1 = 0.5, γ2 = 5, α = 100, β1 = β2 = 1 and for
different levels of inequality-aversion and for β0 ∈ {0.1, 1}.
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losses if abatement in country 0 is not too cheap: For β0 = 1, emissions increase by
10 units. The inclusion of country 0 is only welfare-improving if a developing coun-
try can provide low-priced abatement opportunities (β0 = 0.2) which compensate for
the increase in emissions due to the drop-out of one other country. This is differ-
ent, however, if countries are equity-oriented: Differently from the IND scenario, the
coalition size can be increased even for moderate levels of a1 = a2. For example, for
a1 = a2 = 2 already a coalition of 5 countries can be sustained if β0 = β1 = β2. The
chances of cooperation are even increased if abatement in country 0 gets cheaper, i.e.
for β0 = 0.5 < β1 = β2. Here, the grand coalition can be sustained already for an
equity-parameter of 2.
Let us now look at the asymmetric case γ1 = 0.5 and γ2 = 5. Here, due to different
marginal damages in countries, the coalition size is larger than for the symmetric case
even without equity-preferences. For scenario IND, all low damage and one high dam-
age country can cooperate (k1 = 5, k2 = 1). As argued in the previous section, the
variance in marginal damages increases cooperation levels since low-damage countries
can provide their high-damage counterparts with cheap abatement possibilities and,
thus, gain from emissions trading. For increasing inequality-aversion, both total emis-
sions and payoff decrease if the coalition structure stays the same or the stability of a
coalition is destroyed (k1 = k2 = 2 is no longer stable for a1 = a2 = 1). However, also
in this case, equity-preferences can improve cooperation and efficiency as they may
provide enough incentives to form the grand coalition (a1 = a2 ≥ 2. If we turn to
scenario DEV, the inclusion of country 0 can again destroy the stability of a coalition
(k1 = k2 = 2 is no longer stable for a1 = a2 = 0) and thereby can lead to efficiency
losses. For any level of equity-orientation, however, allowing for abatement in country
0 increases cooperation and abatement rates.
Comparing scenario (a1 = 5, a2 = 0) with (a1 = 0, a2 = 5), it appears to be more
important that countries with small marginal damages are equity-oriented. Here, for
DEV with β0 = 0.2, the grand coalition is stable if a2 = 5, whereas only two high
damage countries cooperate if a1 = 0. To understand this result let us study the
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grand coalition. In the grand coalition, emission and utility levels are the same as if all
countries would not be interested in equity at all as long as there is one country with
ai = 0. Therefore, if a country with ai = 0 leaves the coalition, the utility changes are
the same as if all countries had standard preferences. However, if an equity-oriented
leaves the coalition, it adjusts its abatement towards the average abatement by the
remaining coalition. The decision of the rest of the coalition, however, does not de-
pend on inequality-aversion of some members as there is at least one inequality-neutral
country. Hence, inequality-aversion influences the incentives to form a coalition, i.e.
∆(S), only via the changed abatement level of the leaving country. In our case, for a
low-damage equity-oriented country this change is sufficient to stabilize the grand coali-
tion. If high-damage countries are equity-oriented, the coalition size can be increased
only slightly (to k1 = 5, k2 = 2).
We can summarize our findings as follows:
Result 1 If countries are sufficiently interested in equity, the grand coalition is stable.
Result 2 For coalitions which are stable without equity-preferences, the stability can
be destroyed if some countries are equity-interested and no abatement is allowed in de-
veloping countries. In this case, equity-preferences lead to larger emission and smaller
aggregate payoff levels.
Result 3 The inclusion of developing countries into a coalition by allowing for emis-
sion reduction in such countries increases coalition size and aggregate abatement level if
countries are interested in equity. This holds true even for moderate levels of inequality-
aversion. If countries put no weight on inequality, coalition size and efficiency is de-
creased by allowing for abatement in developing countries.
Result 4 If countries differ with respect to their marginal damages, cooperation and
abatement rates are larger if low-damage countries are equity-oriented than if high-
damage countries showed the same degree of equity-orientation.
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Note that Result 3 suggests that the inclusion of developing countries is indeed im-
portant to sustain a higher level of cooperation. In reality, inequality aversion with
respect to abatement targets can well be motivated by political economy arguments: It
is potentially easier to “sell” an agreement if the burdens are apparently similar for all
countries. If this is true, allowing for abatement in developing countries which them-
selves have no binding targets may prove essential to the stability of an agreement.
This differs substantially from our findings for standard preferences.
Together with Result 1 this confirms previous findings by Lange and Vogt (2003)
that equity-orientation may improve upon the chances of cooperation. Result 2, how-
ever, provides an important caveat: If countries are only slightly driven by inequality-
aversion, predictions on cooperation rates can be even more pessimistic than with
standard preferences. It is here that the inclusion of developing countries is most
important!
5 Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed the impact of three different notions of equity on the chances
of voluntary cooperation between countries. (i) Equity-driven exemptions for develop-
ing countries while opening them for emission reduction projects financed by industri-
alized countries, (ii) equity-concerns with respect to differences in per-capita emissions
between developing and developed countries, and (iii) inequality-aversion regarding the
abatement targets.
The assumption of exemptions for developing countries from reduction targets but al-
lowing other countries to use their abatement potential resembles the current structure
of the Kyoto protocol: Here, developing countries do not have any binding emission
targets but are included via project-based mechanisms like CDM which are financed by
industrialized countries. Although the inclusion of such abatement possibilities clearly
leads to efficiency gains for any given coalition, it does generally not increase the num-
ber of cooperating countries. It can even lead to smaller coalition sizes and thereby be
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welfare-decreasing. Similarly, the chances of cooperation do not qualitatively change if
some countries are concerned with the wide gap in per-capita emissions between devel-
oping and developed countries. Such concerns might, however, increase the abatement
effort by such equity-concerned countries. Only if countries are inequality-averse with
respect to comparing their abatement targets with that of all other countries, the
cooperation rates are generally increased.
The findings in this paper suggest that project-based emission reduction in developing
countries may indeed increase the chances of cooperation – although for a different
reason than usually assumed. The general wisdom in the policy debate is that such
projects decrease the cost of industrialized countries to achieve a given abatement tar-
get and therefore increase the chances of accepting such a target. The paper shows,
however, that cheap abatement opportunities and the implied increase in the abate-
ment targets of any coalition provides additional free-riding incentives for outsiders
and therby might endanger the stability of a coalition. Chances of cooperation are
only increased if these free-riding incentives are limited. This is implicitly the case
if countries are inequality-averse with respect to abatement effort. Consequently, the
exemption of some countries from absolute abatement targets might eventually prove
to beneficial as the chances of cooperation of other countries can be increased.
6 Appendix
Derivation of ∆(S): First note that∑
i∈S
Ui(S) =
∑
i∈S
[−ci(eSi )− di(E(S))]
=
∑
i∈S
[− 1
2βi
(
∑
j∈S
γj)
2 − γiE(S)]
and ∑
i∈S
Ui(S\i) =
∑
i∈S
[−ci(eNi )− di(E(S\i))]
=
∑
i∈S
[− 1
2βi
γ2i − γiE(S\i)]
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We therefore immediately obtain:
∆(S) =
∑
i∈S
Ui(S)−
∑
i∈S
Ui(S\i)
=
∑
i∈S
[
1
2βi
[γ2i − (
∑
j∈S
γj)
2] + γi[E(S\i)− E(S)]
]
=
∑
i∈S
[
1
2βi
[γ2i − (
∑
j∈S
γj)
2] + γi[
∑
j∈S
γj
βi
+
∑
j∈S
γi
βj
− 2γi
βi
]
]
= −3
2
∑
i∈S
γ2i
βi
− 1
2
∑
i∈S
1
βi
(
∑
i∈S
γi)
2 +
∑
i∈S
γi(
∑
i∈S
γi
βi
) +
∑
i∈S
γ2i (
∑
i∈S
1
βi
)
Derivation of total emission level: Rearranging (7) and summing over i 6∈ S we
obtain:
E¯IND − E¯S =
∑
i6∈S
αi − γi
βi + ai(1− e0i /E0IND)
+
∑
i6∈S
ai(1− e0i /E0IND)
βi + ai(1− e0i /E0IND)
e0i
E0IND
E¯IND
Similarly, summing over (8) yields
E¯S =
∑
i∈S(αi/βi)− (
∑
i∈S γi)(
∑
i∈S 1/βi) + (
∑
i∈S 1/βi)(
∑
i∈S 1/ai)
−1 E0S
E0IND
E¯IND(1− E
0
S
E0IND
)
1 + (
∑
i∈S 1/βi)(
∑
i∈S 1/ai)
−1(1− E0S/E0IND)
Adding and rearranging these two formulas we finally arrive at:
E¯IND =
∑
i∈S(αi/βi)−(
∑
i∈S γi)(
∑
i∈S 1/βi)
1+(
∑
i∈S 1/βi)(
∑
i∈S 1/ai)−1(1−
E0
S
E0
IND
)
+
∑
i6∈S
αi−γi
βi+ai(1−e0i /E0IND)
1−
(
∑
i∈S 1/βi)(1−
E0
S
E0
IND
)∑
i∈S 1/ai+(
∑
i∈S 1/βi)(1−
E0
S
E0
IND
)
E0S
E0IND
−∑i6∈S ai(1−e0i /E0IND)βi+ai(1−e0i /E0IND) e0iE0IND
=
∑
i∈S(αi/βi)−(
∑
i∈S γi)(
∑
i∈S 1/βi)
1+(
∑
i∈S 1/βi)(
∑
i∈S 1/ai)−1(1−
E0
S
E0
IND
)
+
∑
i6∈S
αi−γi
βi+ai(1−e0i /E0IND)∑
i∈S 1/ai∑
i∈S 1/ai+(
∑
i∈S 1/βi)(1−
E0
S
E0
IND
)
E0S
E0IND
+
∑
i6∈S
βi
βi+ai(1−e0i /E0)
e0i
E0IND
= E0IND −
(
∑
i∈S γi)(
∑
i∈S 1/βi)(
∑
i∈S 1/ai)
(
∑
i∈S 1/ai)+(
∑
i∈S 1/βi)(1−
E0
S
E0
IND
)
+
∑
i6∈S
γi
βi+ai(1−e0i /E0IND)∑
i∈S 1/ai∑
i∈S 1/ai+(
∑
i∈S 1/βi)(1−
E0
S
E0
IND
)
E0S
E0IND
+
∑
i6∈S
βi
βi+ai(1−e0i /E0IND)
e0i
E0IND
where we used that e0i = αi/βi
For the specific case of two types which differ only with respect to their ai and γi (the
developing country having β0 we obtain for the case of no participation of developing
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countries (scenario IND):
E¯IND = E
0
IND −
(
∑
i∈S γi)k
β+k(
∑
i∈S 1/ai)−1(n−k)/n +
∑
i6∈S
γi
β+ai(n−1)/n
β
β+(
∑
i∈S 1/ai)−1k(n−k)/n
k
n
+
∑
i6∈S
β
β+ai(n−1)/n
1
n
and with participation of the developing country (DEV)
E¯IND = E
0
IND −
(
∑
i∈S γi)(k+β/β0)
β+(
∑
i∈S 1/ai)−1(k+β/β0)(n−k)/n +
∑
i6∈S
γi
β+ai(n−1)/n
β
β+(
∑
i∈S 1/ai)−1(k+β/β0)(n−k)/n
k
n
+
∑
i6∈S
β
β+ai(n−1)/n
1
n
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